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NAVIGATING THE NUANCES OF MODERN EXPERT WITNESS 
LAW: HOW TO TEACH ABOUT EXPERTS 
RONALD L. CARLSON* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Most law students arrive at the door of their first Evidence class with 
personal experience involving only one kind of real world, practicing expert: 
their medical doctor.  There will be the occasional individual whose 
background is more interesting and it brought him or her into contact with a 
psychologist or psychiatrist.  And perhaps the cases encountered during a 
summer law firm clerkship exposed the person to one or two other types of 
experts.  The point is that the student’s contact with the person and topic of 
experts is narrow and limited.  The evidence class is the place to expand the 
horizons. 
Why is this important?  Quite simply because, in the United States, trial by 
jury has become trial by expert.1  Experts testify in over 85% of civil jury 
trials.2  In criminal cases, it is often the DNA expert who provides the dramatic 
proof that turns the direction of the trial.3 
In short, in the world of modern trials, experts are the coin of the realm.  
Lawyers know that most of the time, experts are case-breakers.  Their 
demeanor, knowledge, and presentation ability are key qualities.  Accordingly, 
 
* Fuller E. Callaway Professor, University of Georgia School of Law.  B.A., 1956, Augustana 
College; J.D., 1959, Northwestern University (Clarion De Witt Hardy Scholar); L.L.M., 1961, 
Georgetown University Law Center (E. Barrett Prettyman Fellow in Trial Advocacy).  The author 
gratefully acknowledges the research assistance provided by Shane Lord, UGA law class of 2006. 
 1. Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Minimalist Approach to the Presentation of Expert 
Testimony, 31 STETSON L. REV. 105, 105 (2001). 
 2. Id. (citing a study in the early 1990s of 529 civil cases in the California Superior Court 
where researchers found that 86% used expert testimony). 
 3. Calling experts fulfills juror expectations.  One author refers to the “CSI effect.”  Mark 
Hansen, The Uncertain Science of Evidence, 91 A.B.A. J. 48, 52 (July 2005).  The phrase is 
explained: “The term refers to the impact popular television shows are having on the public’s 
expectations of what forensic science can and cannot do.”  Id.  Jurors are disappointed and will 
vote against a party if the technologies they see on TV are not used in court.  Id. at 53.  A 
prosecutor remarked that “[w]e’ve had numerous cases where jurors have told us they acquitted 
even though they thought the defendant was guilty because there was no scientific evidence to 
back us up.”  Id. 
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their persuasive effect on modern lay jurors makes it incumbent upon students 
to fully grasp the outlines and details of expert witness law.  This is so much 
the case that many evidence instructors consider experts the most significant 
topic in the course. 
The subject has profound significance for judges as well.  It is the function 
of today’s trial judge to ensure that the expert’s opinions are appropriately 
grounded and directed.  That means not allowing a social worker to testify 
about the medical dynamics of bone disease, for example.4  This point brings 
our attention to the law and tactics of laying a foundation for expert proof, a 
step that begins with the expert qualification process. 
II.  TEACHING ABOUT QUALIFICATIONS 
Today’s post-Daubert world places enhanced emphasis upon the 
credentials and backgrounds of prospective witnesses.  If a witness proposes to 
testify that a doctor committed malpractice, the judicial system needs to ensure 
that the speaker has medical training and experience.  A big part of a judge’s 
gatekeeping responsibility is to check an expert’s credentials.  And even if 
qualified, the trial court must exercise care to see that the expert testifies within 
the parameters of her specialty. 
A. Starting at the Start 
The course of study on experts usually begins with the witness 
qualification process.  Most text presentations, as well as in-class instruction, 
commence with this step.  In this respect, classroom treatment tracks 
courtroom practice.  As all lawyers know, an expert at trial must initially be 
shown to be especially skilled in some relevant scientific, professional, or other 
technical process.5 
The emphasis on expert credentials brings home to students that we do not 
lightly dispense with the rule against opinions.  Lay witnesses testify to facts, 
with a few exceptions.  The only witnesses allowed to freely employ the most 
 
 4. See, e.g., Gilbert v. DaimlerChrysler, 685 N.W.2d 391, 410 (Mich. 2004). 
 5. The duty of the court to check expert qualifications was stated in Smith v. Ford Motor 
Co.: “In analyzing the reliability of proposed expert testimony, the role of the court is to 
determine whether the expert is qualified in the relevant field and to examine the methodology the 
expert has used in reaching his conclusions.”  215 F.3d 713, 718 (7th Cir. 2000).  Cases in which 
experts were deemed to be qualified include United States v. McPhilomy, 270 F.3d 1302, 1312–
13 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding a geologist qualified by education and experience to testify as expert 
on the value of stone) and Groobert v. President and Directors of Georgetown College, 219 F. 
Supp. 2d 1, 7–11 (D.D.C. 2002) (determining personal experience was a proper method for 
assessing reliability of expert testimony regarding future earnings of deceased stock photographer 
in absence of reports or studies on income of stock photographers, and concluding that testimony 
of photographic production company owner with twelve years exclusive work in stock 
photography was reliable and admissible). 
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powerful form of testimony, opinion evidence, are experts.  It is fundamental 
that permission to use this mode of communication comes only after a 
threshold showing of past accomplishments. 
B. Emphasizing the Point 
The care that a lawyer must use in accrediting her witnesses is not readily 
visible to students from perusing appellate cases alone.  Accordingly, it is 
essential that role-playing be utilized to make dramatic the qualifying process.  
With students playing the parts, the class will be able to appreciate the need for 
a lawyer to walk the witness through the witness’s education, publications, 
work experience, and professional associations.  Sources are available to 
illustrate the needed steps.  For example, A Student’s Guide to Elements of 
Proof 6 contains an extensive qualification of an automobile design engineer in 
a products liability case.  In the illustrative case, a claim is made that the 
gasoline tank was improperly located unduly close to the rear bumper when the 
car was manufactured.  This caused the tank to explode in a collision.  The text 
takes the student through the Q. & A. of qualifying the engineer.  After the 
demonstration, the instructor will perhaps highlight how the sponsoring lawyer 
led the witness through his engineering education, work experience focusing 
upon automobile fuel system design, prior courtroom experience,7 professional 
associations and organizations, and publications. 
C. Nuances 
Courts seem more inclined than in the past to police the parameters of 
expert testimony.  Key contemporary issues facing the trial bench include 
whether the witness, although an expert, is talking within an area of his or her 
expertise. 
Recent Michigan experience illustrates.  An expert qualified in subject A 
cannot turn around and testify about subject B.  The Michigan Supreme Court 
said exactly that in Gilbert v. DaimlerChrysler.8  The plaintiff recovered a $21 
million verdict in her sexual harassment suit.9  This was the largest recorded 
compensatory award for a single-plaintiff sexual harassment suit in America.  
“[Plaintiff] contended during her trial that defendant’s failure to deal 
adequately with sexual harassment in her plant led to a permanent change in 
her ‘brain chemistry’ and a relapse into substance abuse and depression, and 
 
 6. RONALD L. CARLSON, A STUDENT’S GUIDE TO ELEMENTS OF PROOF 165 (2005). 
 7. See Irving Prager and Kevin S. Marshall, Examination of Prior Expert Qualification 
and/or Disqualification—(Questionable Questions Under the Rules of Evidence), 24 REV. LITIG. 
559, 562–65 (2005). 
 8. 685 N.W.2d at 394. 
 9. Id. 
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that these conditions will soon lead to her untimely and excruciating death.”10  
The foundation for this theory of recovery was laid by a social worker called to 
the stand by the plaintiff. 
The social worker had apparently studied the plaintiff’s hospital records, 
and was asked several questions on direct examination including: 
Q. Will [plaintiff] be able to work in light of what you know about her 
condition as recently as yesterday?  Will she continue to be physically 
able to work? 
A. No.  Her medical complications at this point have progressed to the 
point where she is going to be physically unable to work fairly soon. 
Q. Do you have any idea what was the cause of her problems as they exist 
in this lady as late as yesterday? 
A. Alcoholism, major depression precipitated by work stresses, and sexual 
harassment.  That is the bottom line.11 
The use of a social worker to provide what the court saw as medical 
conclusions was deemed to be error.  “The medical ‘prognosis’ of a social 
worker who has no training in medicine and lacks any demonstrated ability to 
interpret medical records meaningfully is of little assistance to the trier of 
fact.”12 
The gatekeeping responsibility imposed on judges by cases like Gilbert has 
been robustly interpreted by the appellate courts.  In 2005, the Michigan Court 
of Appeals found the trial court failed to properly exercise its function as the 
gatekeeper of expert opinion testimony.  The trial court erred when it ruled on 
the admissibility of evidence “without either conducting a more searching 
inquiry under its obligation to preclude speculative and unreliable evidence,” 
or holding a hearing regarding the acceptance of an expert’s theories.13  Gilbert 
was cited as requiring trial courts to ensure that any expert testimony admitted 
at trial is reliable.  The court of appeals, quoting Gilbert, added: “Careful 
vetting of all aspects of expert testimony is especially important when an 
expert provides testimony about causation.”14 
Gilbert is also having an impact in other jurisdictions.  The Tennessee 
Court of Appeals cited it for the proposition that when an “expert relies on 
unreliable foundational data, any opinion drawn from that data is likewise 
 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 411. 
 12. Id. at 413. 
 13. Clerc v. Chippewa County War Mem’l Hosp., 705 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2005); see Brian Benner & Ronald Carlson, Gatekeeping After Gilbert: How Lawyers Should 
Address the Court’s New Emphasis, MICH. BUS. L.J. (forthcoming 2006). 
 14. Clerc, 705 N.W.2d at 706. 
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unreliable.”15  The court added: “By the same token, an expert’s testimony is 
unreliable, even when the underlying data is sound, if the expert employed 
flawed methodology or applied sound methodology in a flawed way.”16 
The Gilbert decision illustrates a modern trend.  Gatekeeping is on the 
ascendancy.  In an earlier era, an expert who was generally qualified in an area 
of practice could testify to opinions regarding virtually any aspect of the 
calling.  Today, some particularized degree of skill or experience in specialty 
areas is routinely required.17  Daubert has had an impact on the process.  So 
have recent legislative enactments. 
D. Legislation 
Part of the refining process is attributable to legislative action.  In an era of 
tort reform, legislatures have stepped into the witness qualification process.  A 
2005 Georgia enactment illustrates.  Experts frequently testify against 
architects, accountants, pharmacists, and engineers, among others.  When the 
witness testifies against a doctor in a medical malpractice action in Georgia, 
the witness must demonstrate “professional knowledge and experience” in the 
specialty about which the opinion is given.18  This requirement is satisfied 
 
 15. Waggoner Motors, Inc. v. Waverly Church of Christ, 159 S.W.3d 42, 61 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
2004).  On the need for reliable underlying data, see Montgomery County v. Microvote  Corp., 
320 F.3d 440, 448–49 (3d Cir. 2003), where expert testimony is inadmissible when based upon 
questionable data and when expert did not know the source of the documents on which he relied. 
 16. Waggoner Motors, 159 S.W.3d at 61. 
 17. Experts were rejected for want of qualifications in Ralston v. Smith & Nephew Richards, 
Inc., 275 F.3d 965, 969 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting that the medical witness had never performed 
research in the litigated area of specialty nor had she published anything on the subject).  See also 
Jinro Am. Inc. v. Secure Invs., Inc., 266 F.3d 993, 1005 (9th Cir. 2001), opinion amended by 272 
F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 2001) (witness did not meet qualifications of an expert regarding Korean 
business practices). 
  Of course, expert testimony is sometimes rejected because the topic upon which the 
expert is offered is not one requiring expert guidance.  Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 
283, 295 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that expert testimony was unnecessary to determine similarity 
between plaintiff’s poem and defendant’s movie in copyright infringement case); Eannottie v. 
Carriage Inn of Steubenville, 799 N.E.2d 189, 192 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (rejecting expert 
testimony offered on a question that is within the jury’s range of knowledge); Williams v. Carr, 
565 S.W.2d 400, 404 (Ark. 1978) (stating that “the action of the trial court in qualifying a 
mortician as an expert on the issue of mental anguish and grief is rather shocking . . . to this 
Court,” where a funeral director and embalmer’s attendance at an institute of mortuary science 
and participation in approximately 200 funerals did not render him an expert on the topic of 
“extraordinary grief”); cf. Vogler v. Blackmore, 352 F.3d 150, 155–56 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding 
that admission of expert testimony about grief is in the discretion of trial court).  Three of the 
foregoing cases find expert testimony to be improper in the context of issues to be decided by the 
jury.  On the other hand, the language of drug dealers and their modus operandi are not topics 
with which most jurors are familiar, and law enforcement officers may be allowed to testify on 
these subjects.  United States v. Solorio-Tafolla, 324 F.3d 964, 966 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 18. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-67.1(c)(2) (2005). 
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when the proponent of the witness shows that the expert has been actively 
engaged in the practice of the involved medical specialty “for at least three of 
the last five years.”19  Another way for an expert to satisfy the practice 
limitation is to be a teacher of the subject for the described three-year period.20  
Alerting evidence students to the potential for legislatures prescribing a code of 
qualifications would seem to be worthwhile. 
III.  DAUBERT AND FRYE 
Interest within the academy in scientific evidence is high.  The outpouring 
of literature about Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.21 has been 
colossal.  Rare is the aspiring evidence professor, one who is seeking tenure, 
who does not consider writing an article upon some aspect of Daubert.  It is 
the topic du jour for law reviews and bar journals alike. 
A 2005 survey of articles recently published on the law of evidence 
concluded that expert testimony comprised the greatest segment of 
compositions written on evidentiary topics.22  “By far the largest number of 
articles by subject matter (74, or about one-third) was devoted to various 
aspects of expert evidence.”23 
Accordingly, few instructors need much coaxing when it comes to 
incorporating current Supreme Court jurisprudence on scientific evidence into 
the evidence course curriculum.  What may be less widespread is ensuring that 
future lawyers are aware of the test for scientific evidence in the law school’s 
local jurisdiction.  While this message may not be a priority in schools without 
a substantial in-state enrollment base, it is an important component where a 
law school places the bulk of its graduates in one or two local jurisdictions.24  
 
 19. Id. § 24-9-67.1(c)(2)(A). 
 20. Id. § 24-9-67.1(c)(2)(B).  On the subject of legislatively imposed standards for 
qualifying an expert witness, see Tate ex rel. Estate of Hall v. Detroit Receiving Hospital, 642 
N.W.2d 346 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002). 
 21. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  Around the time of Daubert, an energetic debate occurred 
regarding whether courts had been overwhelmed by “junk science.”  Compare PETER W. HUBER, 
GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991), with Kenneth J. Chesebro, 
Galileo’s Retort: Peter Huber’s Junk Scholarship, 42 AM. U.L. REV. 1637 (1993). 
 22. D. Michael Risinger, Around the Law Reviews, Evidence Section News 5 
(Spring/Summer 2005). 
 23. Id. 
 24. The above comment presupposes that the scientific evidence test in the jurisdiction is 
clearly established.  Usually that will be the case, but not always.  See, e.g., John M. Conley & 
Scott W. Gaylord, We Are Not a Daubert State—But What Are We?  Scientific Evidence in North 
Carolina After Howerton, 6 N.C.J. L. & TECH. 289 (2005); Elizabeth K. Strickland, Making 
Waves in a Sea of Uncertainty: Howerton Muddies the Waters of Expert Testimony Admissibility 
Standards in North Carolina, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1613 (2005).  The case which is the object of these 
writings is Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 597 S.E.2d 674 (N.C. 2004).  While federal courts and 
several states are controlled by Daubert, a few jurisdictions follow standards different from both 
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The professor who boasts that no local law is taught in his or her class does all 
a disservice. 
When the instructor completes the basics of Daubert25 and Frye,26 she 
 
Daubert or Frye.  See Williams v. State, 312 S.E.2d 40, 48 (Ga. 1983) (holding that, to be 
admissible, process analyzing fibers must have reached a scientific state of verifiable certainty).  
Illinois and Missouri are usually listed as Frye jurisdictions.  See People v. Wheeler, 777 N.E.2d 
961, 967 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (“Illinois courts follow the test set forth in Frye . . . .”); State v. 
Kinder, 942 S.W.2d 313, 327 (Mo. 1996) (en banc) (referring to the evidentiary hearing as the 
“Frye hearing”). 
 25. The evolution from Frye to Daubert is traced in Edward J. Imwinkelried & William A. 
Tobin, Comparative Bullet Lead Analysis (CBLA) Evidence: Valid Inference or Ipse Dixit?, 28 
OKLA. CITY. U. L. REV. 43, 45 (2003).  Authors Imwinkelried and Tobin confirmed the presence 
that the “general acceptance” Frye test has in many state trials today: 
In 1923, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia handed down its decision in 
Frye v. United States.  In Frye, the court pronounced that before an expert may base 
courtroom testimony on a scientific theory, the expert’s proponent must lay a foundation 
establishing that the theory is generally accepted within the relevant scientific circles.  At 
one time, Frye was the controlling test in federal court and forty-five of the states. . . . 
[T]he Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., ruled that Frye is 
no longer good [federal] law.  However, the Daubert decision was based on statutory 
construction rather than constitutional analysis.  Hence, even in the states with evidence 
codes patterned after the Federal Rules, the state courts remain free to interpret their 
statutes differently and to continue to adhere to Frye.  [As of 2004,] [e]ighteen states 
[had] opted to continue to adhere to Frye.  Significantly, that number [included] 
jurisdictions such as California, Florida, Illinois, New York, Pennsylvania, and 
Washington.  Since these jurisdictions are among the most populous and litigious states, 
even today Frye is the governing law at most state trials. 
Id. at 54–55. 
  For cases interpreting and applying Daubert, see Craftsmen Limousine, Inc. v. Ford 
Motor Co., 363 F.3d 761, 777 (8th Cir. 2004) (ruling that the expert opinion should not have been 
admitted because it failed to “incorporate all aspects of the economic reality”) (quoting Concord 
Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1057 (8th Cir. 2000)); Hynes v. Energy West, 
Inc., 211 F.3d 1193, 1205 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding expert testimony regarding oxidation of gas 
admissible under Daubert principles); United States v. Ewell, 252 F. Supp. 2d 104, 111–15 
(D.N.J. 2003) (denying defendant’s motion to suppress government’s evidence from DNA testing 
process, where process was capable of verification, subject to peer review and generally accepted, 
error rate was not significant, and laboratory maintained high standards); Christian v. Gray, 65 
P.3d 591, 609–12 (Okla. 2003) (holding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying 
testimony from the plaintiff’s medical expert in a case alleging injury from airborne chemicals 
inhaled while attending a circus because it failed to determine that the expert’s methods were 
insufficient pursuant to one of the particular Daubert factors or some other factor consistent with 
the principles of Daubert). 
 26. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).  Frye imposes a substantial 
impediment to free introduction of novel scientific applications.  In State v. Sipin, 106 P.3d 277 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2005), computer-generated accident reconstruction evidence was inadmissible 
under Frye. 
  While many state jurisdictions follow the general scientific acceptance standard of Frye, 
its strictures led some courts to a more liberal rule even before Daubert.  See United States v. 
Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).  In 1993 in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
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often turns to some of the more enriching advanced issues that mark the field 
of scientific evidence.  The abundant literature which is available supplies an 
avenue to most of these, ranging from the application of Daubert in criminal 
cases27 to a debate over what the Supreme Court meant when it said there must 
be “appropriate validation” of expert testimony in order to make it 
admissible.28 
Other issues involve the extension of Daubert to “soft” science, as opposed 
to instrumental processes.  This is where the proliferating commentary on 
Daubert has dual value.  The exploration of sophisticated issues by 
commentators makes them explicit for instructors in the field.  Further, 
scientific evidence decisions from the courts need to be dissected and 
analyzed.  This is the only way a comprehensive Daubert code can be 
hammered out, for the guidance of the judiciary and the bar.  Commentators do 
both the law of evidence and the world at large a favor when they dedicate 
their efforts to solving Daubert’s mysteries. 
IV.  RULE 703 
Of all the rules contained in Article VII of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
the most difficult for law students to grasp is Rule 703.  This is understandable.  
At first blush, the provisions seem counter-intuitive.  How can an expert rely 
on inadmissible evidence, like hearsay, and still be able to give her opinion?  
Isn’t the opinion flawed by predicating it upon inadmissible data?  Further, 
once the expert states her conclusions, why is she barred from reciting in detail 
the facts she relied upon? 
 
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the Court rejected Frye for federal courts in favor of a liberalized 
standard.  After Daubert, the Third Circuit identified eight non-exclusive factors to consider in 
determining whether a particular scientific method is reliable: 
(1) whether a method consists of a testable hypothesis; (2) whether the method has been 
subject to peer review; (3) the known or potential rate of error; (4) the existence and 
maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s operation; (5) whether the method is 
generally accepted; (6) the relationship of the technique to methods which have been 
established to be reliable; (7) the qualifications of the expert witness testifying based on 
the methodology; and (8) the non-judicial uses to which the method has been put. 
Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig. v. Se. Penn. Trans. Auth., 35 F.3d 717, 742 n.8 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 27. Paul Giannelli, The Supreme Court’s “Criminal” Daubert Cases, 33 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 1071 (2003). 
 28. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Meaning of “Appropriate Validation” in Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Interpreted in Light of the Broader Rationalist Tradition, Not 
the Narrow Scientific Tradition, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 735 (2003). 
  Other issues involve the extension of Daubert to “soft” science, as opposed to 
instrumental processes.  See Alexander Scherr, Daubert & Danger: The “Fit” of Expert 
Predictions in Civil Commitments, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 88 (2003) (stating that mental health 
predictions are subject to, and admissible, under Daubert). 
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In 2000, Professor Daniel Capra and the Federal Evidence Advisory 
Committee effected one of the best clarifications yet engrafted on the rules.  
The 2000 amendment provides a presumption against wholesale disclosure of 
an expert’s underlying data, at least on direct examination.  Clarified by the 
measure are the limits of Rule 703.  An expert can freely rely upon 
customarily-used hearsay or other inadmissible evidence to help her propound 
those conclusions in the courtroom.  What the expert cannot do is use this rule 
to run impermissible data and documents into the record.29  The 2000 
amendment proscribes such bootstrapping.  A major abuse was stanched by the 
enactment. 
After the December 1, 2000 amendment to Rule 703, a number of courts 
have denied admission to an expert’s underlying data.  Turner v. Burlington N. 
Santa Fe R.R. Co.30 is a good example.  The Turner court applied the 
presumption against disclosure when the information is offered by the 
proponent of the expert, and thus rejected a lab report.31  At issue was the 
cause of a fire.  The railroad denied that the fire was caused by its negligence 
and sought to prove that the fire was the result of arson.  Samples of debris 
piles from the railroad’s property were sent to Armstrong Forensic Laboratory 
in Arlington, Texas, for analysis.32  The lab detected gasoline.33  The lab’s 
report was going to be used by a fire investigator to conclude that an arsonist 
started the fire, but the court rejected the testimony, stating: 
The lab report was otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence in the absence of 
foundation testimony by the laboratory that conducted the testing.  The 
prejudice that would result from admission of this evidence was substantial, 
whereas its probative value was minimal.  Because the probative value of this 
otherwise inadmissible evidence does not outweigh its prejudicial effect, our 
inquiry is ended under [Rule] 703.34 
The movement to exclude such hearsay will doubtless be accelerated by 
the 2004 decision of the United States Supreme Court in Crawford v. 
Washington.35  Crawford requires the cross-examination of the authors of 
many of the documents sought to be used by prosecutors against accused 
 
 29. Ronald L. Carlson, Is Revised Expert Witness Rule 703 a Critical Modernization for the 
New Century?, 52 FLA. L. REV. 715, 716 (2000). 
 30. 338 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 31. Id. at 1062. 
 32. Id. at 1060. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 1062.  See Black v. M. & W. Gear Co., 269 F.3d 1220, 1229 (10th Cir. 2001) 
(holding that plaintiff was entitled to rely on an inadmissible article in forming his opinion about 
whether defendants’ mower was defective and unreasonably dangerous; however, plaintiff was 
not entitled to testify concerning the contents of the article, as this evidence was otherwise 
inadmissible). 
 35. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
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persons.  However, often documents relied upon by experts are prepared by 
persons other than the expert who is on the stand.  Dumping such documents 
on the jury in order to simply illustrate the basis for the expert’s opinion would 
seem particularly inappropriate after Crawford. 
Some experts go further and even forecast findings of unconstitutionality 
from an expert merely basing opinions upon hearsay, in certain instances.  One 
such view argues: 
[T]here is a continuum of situations in the analysis of whether an expert 
opinion based on testimonial hearsay violates the Confrontation Clause.  On 
one end of the spectrum are experts who base their opinions almost solely on 
testimonial hearsay and merely recount to the jury what others have said.  This 
type of expert opinion is almost surely a violation of the Confrontation Clause 
if the defendant cannot test the reliability of the expert’s testimony by cross-
examining the declarants of the underlying statements.  On the other end of the 
spectrum exist cases where an expert has relied on a number of sources and 
types of data and has added significant expertise to interpret and analyze them.  
In these circumstances, a confrontation violation likely will not exist because 
the expert’s opinion is truly original and a product of his special knowledge or 
experience, and the defendant can test its reliability by cross-examination of 
the expert.36 
Another commentator has warned about the dangers of an expert witness 
serving as a “conduit” for placing hearsay before the jury.37  Unless the expert 
develops some independent findings of her own, the author warns that the 
expert witness can inappropriately become a “subterfuge” for admitting 
testimonial hearsay.38 
At the very least, there is good reason for counsel to object when an expert 
called by the other side tries to achieve wholesale introduction of the expert’s 
underlying hearsay.  Excellent advice for counsel in this regard is contained in 
Jeffrey Cole’s article, Hearsay, Juries, White Elephants and 
Hippopotamuses.39  Cole advises attorneys to carefully assess whether the 
expert testimony is in reality being used as a vehicle to evade the hearsay 
rule—either intentionally or inadvertently.40  If so, that is objectionable.  Cole 
cites a wealth of caselaw which communicates the message that “otherwise 
inadmissible evidence relied upon by an expert ‘is not somehow 
 
 36. Ross Andrew Oliver, Testimonial Hearsay as the Basis for Expert Opinion: The 
Intersection of the Confrontation Clause and Federal Rule of Evidence 703 After Crawford v. 
Washington, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1539, 1560 (2004). 
 37. Bradley Morin, Science, Crawford, and Testimonial Hearsay: Applying the 
Confrontation Clause to Laboratory Reports, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1243, 1271 (2005). 
 38. Id. at 1272. 
 39. 30 LITIG. 49 (Winter 2004). 
 40. Id. at 55. 
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transmogrified into admissible evidence simply because the expert relies on 
it.’”41 
Federal Evidence Rule 703 does a good job of prohibiting improvident 
disclosure of an expert’s inadmissible background data.  As the authorities we 
have just reviewed indicate, courts have demonstrated a willingness to robustly 
enforce the prohibition.  The continuing need to do so is underlined by the 
experience in courts without this sort of rule.  For example, Iowa Evidence 
Rule 703 did not contain the extra language of the federal rule.  This sort of 
situation invites abuse at the trial level, and appellate supervision is often 
required.  The problem was illuminated when the Iowa Supreme Court decided 
Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L.C.42  Hearsay declarants affirmed in writing an odor 
 
 41. Id. at 56 (quoting In re Lake States Commodities, Inc., 271 B.R. 575, 585 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ill. 2002).  Cole invites the reader to consider the following authorities: 
Hutchinson v. Groskin, 927 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1991) (expert referred to letters from three 
experts and said they were “consistent” with his opinion.  The court of appeals reversed, 
condemning this “tactic” to evade the hearsay rule); State v. Vandeweaghe, 799 A.2d 1, 9 
(N.J. Super. 2002) (“Simply put, ‘[e]xpert testimony is not a vehicle for the wholesale 
introduction of otherwise inadmissible evidence.’”); United States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 
45, 57–59 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[I]n this case the expert was repeating hearsay evidence 
without applying any expertise whatsoever, thereby enabling the government to 
circumvent the rules prohibiting hearsay.”); Option Resource Group v. Chambers 
Development Co., Inc., 967 F. Supp. 846, 850 (W.D. Pa. 1996) (“‘Rule 703 cannot be 
used as a backdoor to get the evidence before the jury.’”); Plourde v Gladstone, 190 F. 
Supp. 2d at 719–21 (If the doctors and veterinarians are not available at trial, then the 
toxicologist’s opinion “really amounts to nothing more than inadmissible ‘hearsay in 
disguise’ under Rule 703.”); Law v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 185 F.R.D. 
324, 341 (D. Kan. 1999) (“The NCAA basically presented [the expert] as a channeler, 
seeking to present non-expert, otherwise inadmissible hearsay through the mouth of an 
economist.”); In re Lake States Commodities, Inc., 271 B.R. 575, 585 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
2002) (otherwise inadmissible evidence relied upon by an expert “is not somehow 
transmogrified into admissible evidence simply because the expert relies on it.”); ID 
Security Systems Canada, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 622; Wantanabe Realty Corp. v. City of 
New York, 2004 WL 188088 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2004) (expert relied on estimate from a 
builder of replacement cost in forming option.  “But an expert may not act as a ‘mere 
conduit’ for the hearsay of another.”); 29 Charles Alan Wright & Victor James Gold, 
Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 6273 (1997) (“Rule 703 does not authorize 
admitting hearsay on the pretense that it is the basis for expert opinion when, in fact, the 
expert adds nothing to the out-of-court statements other than transmitting them to the jury.  
In such a case, Rule 703 is simply inapplicable and the usual rules regulating the 
admissibility of evidence control.”). 
Id. at 55–56.  Cole’s advice, which urges attorneys to object when one’s opponent endeavors to 
use an expert as a hearsay conduit, would seem to be well taken in Missouri.  In Davolt v. 
Highland, 119 S.W.3d 118, 133 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003), the court observed that Missouri law does 
not prohibit an expert from relying upon hearsay, as long as the hearsay “sources serve only as a 
background for [the expert’s] opinion and are not offered as independent substantive evidence.” 
 42. 684 N.W.2d 168 (Iowa 2004). 
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problem emanating from nearby hog confinement facilities.43  The plaintiff 
collected these responses, and medical experts testified to medical and 
breathing problems based upon them.44  The trial court allowed both the 
testimony as well as the written hearsay into evidence.45  This created a 
problem.  Although the Iowa rule generally allowed such information to be 
received in evidence to show the basis for an expert’s opinion,46 the wholesale 
entry into the record of so much raw hearsay was too much even for the Iowa 
court, which reversed the judgment for the plaintiffs. 
As noted, the revised federal rule contains commendable limitations which 
prevent this kind of problem.  Courts following the revised rule have 
vigorously policed unwarranted efforts to bootstrap inadmissible evidence into 
the record.  Less amplified has been court treatment of the Rule 703 escape 
clause, the narrow license provided to allow admission of some underlying 
data in exceptional cases.47  Rule 703 permits disclosure of an expert’s 
underlying information in rare cases when the trial judge determines the 
probative value of the inadmissible data substantially outweighs its prejudicial 
effect.  Hopefully, future adjudications under this clause will afford admission 
of data only in very limited circumstances.  If expansive admissibility under 
this clause is practiced by the courts, the exception will swallow the rule.  The 
intent of the December 2000 revision must be kept in mind, which is to supply 
a presumption against underlying data admissibility.48 
V.  INVADING THE PROVINCE OF THE JURY 
Federal Evidence Rule 704 raises some exciting issues.  An expert has 
wide latitude to state her opinions broadly, circumscribed by only a few 
important limitations.  An expert on mental states of accused persons cannot 
categorically announce that the defendant had the mens rea to commit a 
specific crime.49  Nor may an expert invade the province of the jury in a civil 
 
 43. Id. at 181. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. There are at least three major approaches to this issue.  First, a minority of jurisdictions, 
like Iowa, allow an expert to rely on inadmissible data and also permit disclosure of the data to 
the jury.  A middle position is followed in state and federal courts following Federal Rule 703.  
This allows an expert to rely on hearsay (or other inadmissible evidence) but bars full disclosure 
and rendition of the data to the jury.  Finally, another minority of courts, like those in Michigan, 
disallow expert reliance on hearsay unless the hearsay or other data is admitted at trial.  See 
Badiee v. Brighton Area Sch., 695 N.W.2d 521, 540–41 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005). 
 47. Few cases have been decided.  Minnesota has a similar escape clause in Minnesota Rule 
of Evidence 703.  The provision was applied in Sherman v. Marden, 525 N.W.2d 550, 552 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1994). 
 48. See generally Carlson, supra note 29. 
 49. United States v. Finley, 301 F.3d 1000, 1014–15 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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or criminal case.  She does so, among other ways, by attempting to testify that 
a testator lacked mental capacity to sign a will, in a will contest case. 
A. Legal Opinions and the Ban on Credibility Experts 
Legal opinions, those embracing mixed questions of law and fact, are 
barred.  The license supplied an expert in Rule 704 to propound conclusions on 
ultimate issues is a limited one.  A distinction must be made between opinions 
as to factual matters versus opinions involving a legal analysis.50  For an expert 
to conclude that an architect’s conduct amounted to culpable design negligence 
violates the rules, for example. 
One commentator pleads for more wide-open expert testimony and 
freedom from the “centuries-old doctrine that forbids any witness from 
‘invading the province of the jury.’”51  Of course, he recognizes there are 
appropriate limits.  The author points out that the Federal Evidence Rules 
Advisory Committee “did not mean to allow expert witnesses to offer 
definitions of legal terms or draw legal conclusions.”52  However, he argues 
that allowing experts to opine on the credibility of witnesses violates none of 
these principles.  “[I]f we can determine that there are experts that can provide 
reliable and useful information about credibility (and the evidence suggests 
that we are at or very near that point), why would we want a lay jury to make 
these most critical decisions without any guidance?”53 
Removing the restrictions on expert testimony about witness credibility 
would loosen court restrictions on eyewitness-reliability experts in criminal 
 
 50. MINN. R. EVID 704 comm. cmt. (1977); see Good Shepherd Manor Found., Inc. v. City 
of Momence, 323 F.3d 557, 564 (7th Cir. 2003) (rejecting expert testimony by law professor that 
defendant’s conduct violated federal law); see also Terrell v. Reinecker, 482 N.W.2d 428, 430 
(Iowa 1992). 
 51. Ric Simmons, Conquering the Province of the Jury: Expert Testimony and the 
Professionalization of Fact-Finding, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1013, 1015 (2006). 
 52. Id. at 1025. 
 53. Id. at 1066.  A main target of Professor Simmons is the rule applied in many courts 
which bars eyewitness testimony experts in criminal cases.  Even if that prohibition is eventually 
eroded and eyewitness experts became commonplace, it is doubtful that many courts would 
weaken the related (but not identical) rule, which prohibits any witness, lay or expert, from 
testifying that another witness in the trial lied from the witness stand.  No witness is allowed to 
state directly that another witness who testified earlier in the case lied when the earlier witness 
gave his testimony.  This prohibition has the support of the courts and most commentators.  And 
just as a witness cannot tell the trial jury that a witness who previously testified was lying, 
affirmations that another witness gave honest testimony are similarly barred.  See United States v. 
Perez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d 1, 12–13 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding that it was wrong for a DEA agent to offer 
his opinion that another government witness told the truth about the accused; also, the witness 
should not have testified that “several other witnesses, several other cooperating sources” had 
confirmed the informant’s testimony).  “[T]he prosecution cannot prop up a dubious witness by 
having a government agent place the stature of his office behind the witness,” especially when 
apparently drawing from “evidence” not before the jury.  Id. at 13. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1128 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:1115 
cases.54  It would have the same effect upon the admissibility of polygraph 
evidence.  Currently, many federal circuits and most states maintain a virtual 
ban on admissibility.55 
Contrary to this approach, it is urged that since polygraph tests are so 
widely used in the world outside the courtroom, the forensic ban should be 
reconsidered in light of Daubert.56  “[I]n the case of polygraphs, growing 
evidence indicates that the proffered expert testimony is reliable, and Daubert 
has given courts the opportunity—if not the duty—to re-evaluate existing 
presumptions about [the ban on] expert admissibility.”57 
Whether one concurs or disagrees with these observations, this kind of 
reexamination of traditional doctrine is to be applauded.  Daubert asks courts 
and scholars to review formerly rejected technical processes to determine if 
their rejection is based upon unreliability of the process, or if it simply results 
from the inherent conservatism of the law.  Professor Ric Simmons concludes 
that it is the latter consideration which is responsible for the widespread 
hostility to experts on witness credibility. 
B. Experts on Mental State 
In-class coverage of Rule 704(b) needs to introduce crucial elements of 
history.  The students need to know who John Hinckley is and that he was 
acquitted by reason of insanity in his attempt to assassinate President Reagan.  
Political pressures resulted in the creation of a new provision banning expert 
testimony when that expert overtly tells the trier of fact that the accused “did 
not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime 
charged.”58 
Rule 704(b) is not without its nuances.  United States v. Finley59 
dramatically illustrates the fine line which is drawn between prohibited mental 
state testimony and allowable psychological proof.  The court explained: 
Finley owned a law bookstore and ran a bar review course for students of non-
accredited law schools. . . . Finley began looking for investors to assist him in 
opening a chain of approximately twenty bookstores across the United States.  
 
 54. For the traditional approach rejecting eyewitness experts, see United States v. Smith, 122 
F.3d 1355 (11th Cir. 1997); Johnson v. State, 511 S.E.2d 603 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).  Compare 
People v. Smith, 743 N.Y.S.2d 246 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.. 2002), with State v. Chapple, 660 P.2d 1208 
(Ariz. 1983).  For an overview of the law in different jurisdictions, see John P. Rutledge, They All 
Look Alike: The Inaccuracy of Cross-Racial Identifications, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 207, 218–20 
(2001). 
 55. Simmons, supra note 51, at 1042–43; see United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 
(1998); United States v. Campos, 217 F.3d 707 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 56. Simmons, supra note 51, at 1043–44. 
 57. Id. at 1046. 
 58. FED. R. EVID. 704(b). 
 59. 301 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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Finley could not obtain traditional bank financing because of a dispute he had 
with the IRS over a large tax claim.60 
Finley’s efforts to get financing resulted in three counts of bank fraud, and he 
was convicted on two of them.  His conviction was reversed when the Court of 
Appeals determined that the trial court erred in striking the testimony of 
Finley’s psychological expert, Dr. Wicks.61  Dr. Wicks suggested that the 
defendant’s rigid belief system distorted reality.62  The defendant could not 
realistically assess the fraudulent nature of monetary instruments he attempted 
to cash, it was claimed.  This delusional disorder makes it difficult for an 
individual to entertain the intent to commit fraud, the key element of the 
charged offense.63 
Writing the opinion for the court, Judge Myron Bright deemed it essential 
in Finley to distinguish between prohibited expert opinions that “necessarily 
compel” a conclusion about the defendant’s mens rea and those which do 
not.64  The latter are permissible.  He observed that the testimony of Dr. Wicks 
did not compel the conclusion that Finley was incapable of knowingly 
defrauding the banks.65  However, the jury could infer that conclusion from the 
testimony.  Finley claimed he was innocent of any knowing intent to defraud.66  
Judge Bright ruled that the defense was entitled to present evidence to support 
that assertion.67  This included expert opinions from which the jury could draw 
the inference that the defendant lacked the necessary intent to defraud.68  But 
such an inference did not compel a diagnosis of no criminal mens rea.69  “A 
psychological diagnosis, unlike a lie detector test, does not automatically entail 
an opinion on the truth of a patient’s statements.  Furthermore, the 
psychological diagnosis can be limited such that it in no way touches upon the 
specific issues of fact to be resolved by the jury.”70 
Whether one agrees or disagrees with whether Judge Bright correctly 
gauged the compulsion inherent in the expert’s testimony, all can concur on 
one point.  That relates to the creativity of courts.  Judges can be very inventive 
in getting around the prohibition against testimony on the defendant’s ultimate 
mental state.  Innovation by judges in avoiding the impact of Rule 704(b) is 
 
 60. Id. at 1002. 
 61. Id. at 1019. 
 62. Id. at 1005–06. 
 63. Id. at 1005. 
 64. Finley, 301 F.3d. at 1015. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 1016 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Finley, 301 F.3d. at 1016. 
 70. Id. 
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one hallmark of judicial opinions in this field.71  Finley amply illustrates the 
point. 
VI.  ADVOCATES AND INSTRUCTORS 
The life of the law revolves around trials.  Law school coursebooks—no 
matter whether the text is one in contracts, antitrust, criminal law, or 
corporations—are filled with appellate cases which began as trials.  
Notwithstanding some commendable emphasis in recent years on alternate 
modes of processing disputes, the trial remains the gold standard for the 
resolution of society’s conflicts. 
The role of the lawyer in the process is not an ambiguous one.  A 
perceptive commentator observed: “The adversarial component of the 
litigation process is the cornerstone of the American justice system.  Ideally, if 
two equally matched attorneys zealously and competently represent their 
clients within the bounds of the ethical rules and the law, the correct result will 
ultimately be reached.”72 
The advocate, in turn, relies most heavily in discharging his or her weighty 
responsibility upon knowledge of the law of evidence.  Going to court without 
a thorough command of the rules is like a carpenter going to a construction job 
without his hammer, a welder without his torch, or a police officer without her 
baton.  Competency in the topic begins with the law school course in Evidence.  
Accordingly, the instructor in this field performs one of the most crucial 
functions needed to sustain an adversary system of justice.  She educates 
society’s advocates in their most vital body of knowledge. 
Outstanding advocates are critically needed in all of the various areas of 
litigation, including contract cases, product liability disputes, tort claims, or 
real estate controversies.  But there is a special need for accomplished 
attorneys in the field of criminal law.  Commentators have urged that of all the 
rights that an accused person has, the right to representation by a trained 
lawyer is the most important.  One, in particular, writes: 
Only the adversarial system can effectuate the search for the truth.  The 
alternative is a nonadversarial society whereby one being accused is the 
equivalent of one being convicted.  If criminal defense lawyers do not “put the 
government to its proof whenever necessary or whenever the client requires it, 
then we are close to those totalitarian states where accusation equals guilt [and] 
the criminal defense lawyers are but an adjunct prosecutor expected to make 
the client confess and aid in his or her rehabilitation.”  Hence, if criminal 
 
 71. Simmons, supra note 51, at 1026 (citing United States v. Lipscomb, 14 F.3d 1236, 
1240–43 (7th Cir. 1994)); see, e.g., United States v. Combs, 369 F.3d 925 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 72. Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Ending Illegitimate Advocacy: Reinvirgorating Rule 11 Through 
Enhancement of the Ethical Duty to Report, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1555, 1616 (2001). 
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defendants are not represented, the foundation of the judicial system is 
eroded . . . .73 
VII.  ETHICS 
Some instructors will wish to incorporate treatment of ethics issues which 
are particular to the topic of experts.  A number of problems are worthy of 
potential consideration.  When qualifying a medical doctor, should the 
sponsoring lawyer leave out an aspect of a physician’s background?  If the 
point of history is unhelpful to the calling lawyer, is it legitimate to omit it?  
Suppose a testifying doctor in a medical malpractice case sat for part of the 
certification examination of the American Board of Surgery, but failed the 
examination.  Does this information need to be volunteered?  What if the 
sponsoring lawyer is virtually certain that the opposing attorney will not 
discover nor ask about the point? 
Cross-examination of experts also poses ethical dilemmas.  If the cross-
examiner is convinced that an opposing expert is incompetent and lying, is it 
appropriate to ask about a medical treatise which is non-existent?  If the 
overblown expert answers, “Yes, I know that book,” can the cross-examiner 
expose the fraud?74 
While the course in Professional Responsibility will take primary 
responsibility for a student’s formal ethics instruction, touching upon selected 
ethics issues in the Evidence class can be helpful. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
The role of the Evidence instructor is a vital one in sustaining the 
adversary system of justice.  Nowhere in the Evidence course is skill in 
instruction more challenged than when presenting the topic of experts.  The 
sophistications and nuances embedded in the cascade of cases authored by 
courts pose a withering challenge for the Evidence teacher.  Exactly what 
subtopics will be selected for coverage? 
This Essay has posited a rough diagram of topics for Evidence professors.  
How experts are qualified, dissatisfaction with Frye, the rise of junk science, 
controlling wide-open admission of an expert’s underlying data, the ban on 
legal opinions, the role of the advocate, and the ethics of experts are all worthy 
subjects.  They are topics which I cover in my course. 
After forty years of teaching the law of evidence, it has been an enriching 
trail.  Dean Mason Ladd at Iowa began the trip for me when he asked me to 
 
 73. Stephen Jones, A Lawyer’s Ethical Duty to Represent the Unpopular Client, 1 CHAP. L. 
REV. 105, 107 (1998) (quoting JOHN WESELY HALL, JR., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE 
CRIMINAL LAWYER § 9:12, at 297–98 (2d ed. 1996)). 
 74. This issue is discussed in RONALD L. CARLSON & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, 
DYNAMICS OF TRIAL PRACTICE: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS, 318–19 (3d ed. 2002). 
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teach his Evidence class.  He was about to start a new law school at Florida 
State, he explained, and needed me to take over from time to time when he was 
absent from Iowa City.  Since that time I have taught the course on forty-four 
occasions at six different law schools.  I will be forever grateful for Dean 
Ladd’s original request. 
